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John Foxwell     j.m.r.foxwell@durham.ac.uk  
 
 
Enacting Hallucinatory Experience in Fiction: Metalepsis, Agency, and the 
Phenomenology of Reading in Muriel Spark’s The Comforters 
 
“‘[T]he mechanics of the hallucinations are well managed’” – so said Evelyn Waugh in his 
reply to Alan Barnsely, Spark’s literary agent, upon reading proofs of The Comforters prior to 
its publication in 1957 (qtd. in Spark, CV 207). The comment is intriguing, particularly in 
light of the fact that Waugh, like Spark, had suffered from hallucinations which led him to a 
write a novel on the same subject, The Ordeal of Gilbert Pinfold, published in the same year. 
Yet Waugh’s novel – certainly not one of his most celebrated – engages with the issue in a 
very different fashion to Spark's. There are no metafictional “mechanics” brought into play, 
and instead the book reads rather like a slow-paced thriller in which it eventually becomes 
apparent that the only logical explanation for the “ordeal” is that the Pinfold is hallucinating. 
Not so in The Comforters, in which the protagonist, Caroline, hears the voice of the narrator 
telling the very story in which she is a character. This metaleptic intrusion into a character’s 
consciousness, quite apart from its attendant metafictional implications, appears to have 
captured something of the phenomenological quality of auditory verbal hallucinations 
(AVHs) which The Ordeal of Gilbert Pinfold did not, and Waugh himself admitted that he 
was “struck by how much more ambitious was Miss Spark’s essay, and how much better she 
had accomplished it” (E. Waugh).1 This seems, indeed, to have been a part of Spark’s aim, 
for although she states in her autobiography Curriculum Vitae that she intended to write a 
novel about her experience of hallucinations – which, unlike Waugh’s, were visual rather 
than auditory (Spark, CV 206) – within the novel itself she has Caroline feel “a suffocating 
sense that she might never communicate the reality of what she had heard” directly after she 
has ‘explained her distress’ in straightforward terms (Spark, TC 55).  
 Previous criticism on The Comforters has tended to focus heavily on what might be 
called the novel’s metafictional elements. On the one hand, critics such as McQuillan have 
argued that the novel’s metafictional play allows for a “redistribution of novelistic 
possibilities”, which functions with “a view to bringing the reader to an awareness of their 
own ‘construction’” (McQuillan 10,12; see also P. Waugh, 18-19). On the other hand, some 
critics have focused less on what these metafictional elements entail and more on the 
dynamics of the “curious, uncanny, ‘battle’ between [the] author and her fictional creation, 
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the character, for control of the novel” (Nicol 112). Questions of free will, autonomy and 
control are, as Stevenson points out, “central issues” in The Comforters (99), as they are in 
several of Spark’s other novels, and in this regard the novel has an interesting relationship 
with James Hogg’s Confessions of a Justified Sinner. As Herman has noted, Hogg’s novel 
had a formative influence on Spark’s writing, and indeed Confessions and The Comforters 
share certain similarities. Above all, both novels feature protagonists who may or may not be 
hallucinating, and in both it is unclear whether these protagonists have the capacity for 
genuine autonomy. In many respects, therefore, The Comforters is a novel about control, 
agency and autonomy, as much as it is a novel “about” fictionality. 
Yet The Comforters can also be read as a novel “about” hallucinations. As Evelyn 
Waugh observes in his 1957 review, the novel attempts “to combine two distinct themes, 
each with its own leading character. The first theme is the mechanics of story-telling, the 
second a case-history of insanity” (E. Waugh). Since the former of these two themes has 
already been thoroughly researched, I engage instead with the latter, exploring how Spark 
uses the creative space which fiction provides to model a form of hallucinatory experience in 
a fashion that conveys aspects of that experience to the reader. Therefore, rather than viewing 
Caroline’s hallucinations as being primarily representative of something else, or as providing 
a sort of vehicle for introducing the novel’s metafictional play, I view hallucinatory 
experience itself as the object of representation. In this light the novel’s metafictional 
elements function as part of that representation, simultaneously eliciting a specific type of 
readerly response which mimics the experientiality of AVHs while also signifying the 
destabilization of Caroline’s sense of self which results from her hallucinations.  
The present article therefore examines The Comforters in the context of voice-
hearing, in part as a way of exploring how Spark attempts to communicate the 
phenomenological “reality” of abnormal psychological experience, and in part as a way of 
engaging with Spark’s ideas surrounding thought, agency and the self which she expounds in 
relation to auditory verbal hallucinations. In the first section I draw on research in cognitive 
literary studies and audionarratology in order to show how Spark’s novel plays with 
discourse conventions in a way that lends the representation of Caroline’s hallucinations a 
distinctive phenomenology, thus evoking several of the experiential aspects of AVHs. In this 
regard, rather than attempting to put forward a model of normative reading experiences, I am 
examining how those norms are subverted by Spark’s use of experimental metafictional 
techniques. Furthermore, I suggest that the necessity of using such techniques to create a 
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feeling of phenomenological difference seems to point to a pre-existent similarity between 
the experiences of reading and voice-hearing.  
The second section then examines how the metafictional devices which Spark uses to 
convey the experientiality of AVHs also serve to represent the psychological effects of 
hallucinatory experience on the experiencing subject. Basing my approach in recent insights 
from psychology and philosophy of mind, I examine how the novel suggests that 
hallucinations undermine Caroline’s sense of self by compromising her sense of agency, and 
how Spark thus uses the context of AVHs to explore the relationship between the capacity to 
perform agentive or self-directed action and the sense of having a real and persistent identity. 
It is worth noting that here I deal primarily with the “higher-order” cognitive concepts of 
agency and self, such as the “sense of oneself as an agent apart from any particular action” 
(Pacherie, “Sense of Control”), rather than the pre-reflective, embodied experiences which 
inform the development of such concepts over time. Although, as Malafouris points out, the 
subject’s “conscious agency judgement” might not be identical with the “proper origin” of an 
action (26), such judgements are still important heuristics which we use constantly to 
navigate our environment. Hallucinations, I argue, undermine these heuristics in a manner 
which suggests that while we might be able to theoretically dismiss concepts such as self-
world dualism and the sense of the self-as-agent, it is another thing altogether to have these 
concepts radically destabilized by lived experience.  
 
 
 
Reading the Voice: The Phenomenology of Hallucinatory Experience 
 
While The Comforters does have an ostensive “plot” – a somewhat trite and overly 
coincidental narrative about a diamond-smuggling grandmother and her family’s attempts to 
interfere in her affairs – in many respects it serves only as a kind of self-consciously fictional 
backdrop for the far more unusual, and hence more interesting, experiences of the young 
literary critic Caroline Rose. At approximately a quarter of the way through the novel, 
Caroline begins to hear the clicking of a disembodied typewriter, followed by a chorus of 
voices narrating her actions after she has performed them (as a result, the reader encounters 
certain sentences and paragraphs twice: first as narration, and then as the sounds which 
Caroline hears in the storyworld). To Caroline’s distress the voices quickly prove themselves 
able to access her thoughts as well as her actions, and eventually Caroline becomes 
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convinced that they are in fact from one person, “‘a writer on another plane of existence’” 
(64) writing a story about the characters in the novel. The voice confirms this, and Caroline 
subsequently attempts to prove her independence by thwarting one of its proleptic assertions 
regarding her future actions. When the attempt fails Caroline even becomes able to ‘overhear’ 
portions of the text which relate to characters distant from her in space and time, which 
appears to impede the narrator’s ability to narrate the story. Finally, once the diamond 
smuggling plot has been resolved, Caroline decides to write a novel about “‘Characters in a 
novel’” (213), and the novel ends with the implication that another of the characters, 
Laurence Manders, has read “the book” and discovered within it a facsimile of a letter which 
he wrote and promptly destroyed. The exact dimensions of Caroline’s experiences in The 
Comforters are thus difficult to establish, primarily because the set of “rules” governing the 
relationship between the novel and the fictional world it creates are subject to numerous 
changes. Yet rather than attempt to explain the novel’s disparate and contradictory elements 
according to the logic of the storyworld, this section instead draws on ideas from text world 
theory (and related frameworks for inquiry) to explore how such features contribute to an 
overall aesthetic effect which is representative of various aspects of hallucinatory experience.  
According to text world theory, the act of reading involves at least two levels or 
“worlds” with which the reader is in some sense engaged: the discourse world, which Gavins 
defines as “the immediate situation surrounding one speaker or writer and one or more 
listeners or readers, participating in a joint language venture”; and the text world, or rather, 
“text worlds”, the “mental representations” created by the participants of the discourse world 
(19). Various “world-building elements”, constituted by “deictic and referential elements 
contained within the text”, cue construction of the basic features of the text world, while 
“function-advancing propositions”, which relate to “the actions, events or arguments 
involving the entities present in the text world” (20), serve to advance the plot. Furthermore, 
various types of “sub-world” can exist within the text world, including those initiated by the 
characters. Such sub-worlds can arise from “any shift in the tense in the main text world, as 
well as instances of Direct Speech” (21).  
The language which constitutes the world-building elements and function-advancing 
propositions of the literary narrative text thus predominantly functions – or more precisely, is 
predominantly cognized by the reader – as a set of instructions guiding the imagination in the 
construction of a mental representation (i.e. the text world). While it is being read such 
language is unlikely to be at the center of the reader’s attention, or at least, its linguistic 
aspect is unlikely to be the object of conscious scrutiny. As Ingarden suggests,  
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During reading, we are usually absorbed in apprehending the objectivities portrayed in the work, which 
then seem to occupy the foreground of the concretization. The details of the semantic stratum […] will 
then hardly be grasped for themselves because, in reading, one generally only passes through them to 
reach the portrayed objects. (91) 
Similarly, Birkerts observes that “we generally don’t remember the language at all, unless it’s 
dialogue. For reading is a conversion, a turning of codes into contents” (87). The reason 
Birkerts makes an exception for dialogue appears to be that there is a distinction between the 
language which is cognized primarily as instructions for the construction of the text world 
(i.e. “code”), and the language which has existence as language within the text world, and is 
thus one of the “portrayed objects” (i.e. “content”). Language as content will thus primarily 
exist as an imagined entity, an “auditory imagery experience” (AIE) as Kurby et al. put it 
(457), in much the same way as any other kind of entity – a physical object, for instance – is 
also part of the imagined content of the mental representation of the text world. Therefore, 
direct thought and speech are predominantly content rather than code, and while language as 
content has the potential to provide further code for the building of sub-worlds, these sub-
worlds tend to be regarded peripherally (if at all) while such language is being cognized as an 
auditory utterance in the primary text world. 
Recent research in cognitive neuroscience and audionarratology has further served to 
emphasize the difference between language as code and language as content. The results of 
the lexical decision experiments of Abramson and Goldinger suggest that “acoustic 
representations activated in silent reading are best characterized as inner speech rather than 
abstract phonological codes” (1065). Moreover, research conducted by Yao et al. points to a 
distinction between how direct speech and indirect speech are experienced by the reader, 
since “silent reading of direct versus indirect speech engenders differential brain activation in 
voice-selective areas of the auditory cortex” (3146). This finding in turn “suggests that, even 
during silent reading of text, direct speech may be more likely to activate ‘audible speech’-
like representations than indirect speech” – or, as they later put it, “mental simulations of 
voice” (3151). Such evidence suggests, at least preliminarily, that language as code and 
language as content are cognized differently, and are the focus of different kinds of readerly 
attention. 
This research suggests how Spark’s use of metalepsis enables her to portray a voice 
that feels to the reader as if it does not “belong”, and which is perceived as an experience 
phenomenologically distinct from that of overhearing the discourse of other characters. That 
Spark considered this a necessary quality for the voice to possess is suggested by her 
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description of her own experience of (visual) hallucinations, in which she states that “as long 
as this sensation lasted, I knew they were hallucinations” (Spark, CV 204). According to 
Ratcliffe, such awareness is common amongst people who experience hallucinations, in that 
“[t]he hallucinated contents are somehow ‘not quite real’, ‘not fully present’, and therefore 
phenomenologically distinguishable from other ‘perceptions’”, thus exhibiting “a distinctive 
kind of intentionality” (105, 106). By having Caroline hear the narrative itself as a 
hallucination, Spark causes the reader to encounter certain stretches of narration twice, the 
first time as code, and the second time as content. While the two passages are, in most cases, 
linguistically identical, the text cues the reader to cognize the repetition as an auditory 
imagery experience by presenting it as a sound which Caroline hears, just as dialogue is also 
cued to be heard as content rather than code. Since the two passages are linguistically 
identical, their juxtaposition foregrounds the phenomenological difference associated with the 
two nonconscious modes of cognizing language in a way that normal instances of direct 
speech and thought do not. Of course, the reader may not be specifically aware of what has 
changed – i.e. that their intentional stance to the language has shifted – but they will 
nonetheless be aware that something has changed, and that this something is tied to the fact 
that the voice’s utterance possesses a felt quality that is phenomenologically distinct from the 
rest of the text. This strategy is notably different from Waugh’s presentation of Pinfold’s 
hallucinations, which are not depicted as distinct from any other dialogic exchanges in the 
novel and which subsequently do not elicit the sense of phenomenological strangeness which 
Spark attempts to evoke through verbal doubling in The Comforters.   
Yet Spark also captures something of the intrusive and uncontrollable quality of 
voice-hearing in that the voice feels as if it does not belong in the text world. In its first 
iteration, the stretch of narration that is later repeated functions as code in that it constitutes 
Caroline’s being, directing the reader to construct the mental representation of Caroline and 
her thoughts and actions. Its reappearance as content, as something that Caroline herself 
experiences, is from the reader’s perspective paradoxical and impossible, and is therefore 
disturbingly intrusive. Since up until this point (approximately a quarter of the way through 
The Comforters), the novel has kept within the bounds of realism, the metaleptic intrusion of 
the voice is still more shocking to the reader in that it violates those expectations which the 
novel itself has already established. Indeed, it is likely that for those readers who first 
encountered The Comforters in 1957 this effect would have been even more pronounced, 
given that Spark was a new writer (and was yet to establish her distinctive oeuvre in which 
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such metafictional play is fairly commonplace), and that the novel was published before the 
advent of postmodernism proper. 
Yet part of the brilliance of Spark’s technique is that the voice’s appearance continues 
to be intrusive to the reader. As Fludernik (via Culler) points out, “[i]f readers encounter 
initially odd, inexplicable elements, they will attempt to recuperate these items by taking 
recourse to available interpretative patterns”, ultimately naturalizing such items “within a 
frame that re-familiarizes the initial oddity” (23). However, as noted above, the “rules” 
governing the nature of the passages which Caroline is able to overhear keep changing, so 
that while the voice initially confines itself to “remarking her own thoughts” (Spark TC 43) – 
quite literally “re-marking” them as opposed to remarking on them (and Spark’s omission of 
the preposition here is telling) – it quickly begins to broaden its range, commenting on 
Caroline’s mental states (45), the things which she has “failed to register” (47), her status as a 
fictional character (70), and even her future actions (95). As a result each occurrence of the 
voice disrupts the reader’s interpretative frame, so that he or she must continuously apply 
different frames or schemas to the voice in order to make sense of its presence in a manner 
that is analogous to Caroline’s varying attempts to make sense of her experience. Therefore, 
not only are readers forced to grapple with a phenomenon which violates the text-world they 
are immersed in, but their attempts to control it by naturalizing it comprehensively within a 
sensible schema or frame are continuously thwarted. The voice thus remains intrusive for the 
reader precisely because the rules governing its appearance remain unfixed – unlike, say, the 
voices in Waugh’s novel, which remain disturbing for Pinfold but not for the reader, who is 
able to naturalize them without much difficulty by using the explanatory frame of AVHs to 
account for his experiences. 
Yet the very fact that Spark needed to use such metafictional mechanics to achieve a 
mimesis of AVHs which was more ‘successful’ than Waugh’s more straightforward approach 
is in itself indicative of an already-present isomorphism between the phenomenologies of 
reading and voice-hearing. As Stonebridge notes, “[l]iterature […], it is often claimed, is one 
place where you can hear the voices of others without actually going mad: in some ways it is 
the consciousness of this fact that makes fiction fiction” (453). However, since the 
phenomenology of reading is already so natural to us as readers that it passes unnoticed, it 
follows logically that defamiliarizing and experimental metafictional devices, such as Spark’s 
use of metalepsis, have the potential to reacquaint us with the strangeness of this experience 
in a way that can imitate the experience of hearing voices.  
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It appears that Spark herself suggests this relationship between reading and voice-
hearing within The Comforters. On the one hand, her reflections in Curriculum Vitae on why 
she tried to represent auditory rather than visual hallucinations – despite the fact that she 
herself had only experienced the latter – reveal a keen awareness of the dynamics of reading. 
She acknowledges, for instance, that “[f]rom the aspect of method, I could see that to create a 
character who suffered from verbal illusions on the printed page would be clumsy. So I made 
my main character ‘hear’ a typewriter with voices composing the novel itself” (Spark, CV 
207). This comment suggests that Spark gave some thought to how readers encounter literary 
texts, and her use of metafiction in The Comforters – quite apart from producing the 
phenomenological effects already described – provided her with a means of examining 
certain aspects of the experience of reading in more detail.  
On the other hand, Spark’s use of metalepsis means that Caroline not only hears a 
voice but also engages with a text – the very same text, in fact, with which the reader is also 
engaged. In this sense, Caroline is also another reader (or hearer, to be more precise), of the 
novel. Although at first she encounters the text a few moments after readers do, as time goes 
by she begins to ‘hear’ almost simultaneously with them – or rather, the narrator refers 
analeptically to which passages Caroline has or has not “‘picked up’” rather than embedding 
her experiences within a scene (146). Furthermore, she begins to comment on the text itself, 
for instance stating that she finds one passage in “‘Bad taste’” (146). In so doing, she places 
herself in a relationship to the text which is analogous to that enjoyed by the reader, since 
making aesthetic judgements of the text itself is an activity which is usually confined to 
discourse-world rather than text-world participants. Indeed, Spark’s particular choice of verb 
here – or rather, her avoidance of the verb “hear” in this instance – is also indicative of the 
analogy she is pursuing, that of Caroline as reader as well as voice-hearer. 
As mentioned previously, Abramson and Goldinger’s experiments suggest that the 
“acoustic representations activated in silent reading are best characterized as inner speech 
rather than abstract phonological codes” (1059). This finding implies that, while reading, the 
reader’s capacity for inner speech is already in use in a way that precludes the simultaneous 
generation of self-authored inner speech. As Poulet describes it, the reader thus becomes “the 
prey of language. There is no escaping this take-over” (58). And in a sense it is a “take-over”, 
a “hijacking” of inner speech and, along with it, the reader’s capacity for introspective 
thought. Therefore while reading the reader is made to think thoughts that are not self-
authored, so that his or her “‘mind is working under the pressure of someone else’s necessity, 
and under the suggestive power of some irresponsible writer’” (Spark, TC 107). Of course, 
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the reader can always restore a sense of being in control by simply shutting the book, but 
while engaged in the text world the exploration of that world, and what happens within it, the 
reader remains subject to the control of the author. In being absorbed in the text world and 
allowing their imagination to be guided by the code of the discourse world, readers are thus, 
in a sense, robbed of their capacity for agency. Like the reader Caroline is incapable of 
holding out “for what she wanted and what she didn’t want in the way of a plot” (109), even 
though normally in narrative fiction the author sustains the illusion that the characters, as 
participants in the text world, do have an influence on the plot. However, as a “reader” 
Caroline loses her capacity for agency, or rather, becomes aware of her incapacity for agency.  
Because of the metaphorical connection which the novel establishes between reading 
and voice-hearing, Caroline’s loss of a sense of agency as a reader thus also suggests that a 
loss of a sense of agency is attendant upon the experience of hearing voices. Indeed, as 
discussed in the next section, Caroline’s growing sense of distress upon hearing the voice 
narrating her thoughts is in part tied to her awareness that such an occurrence also implies 
that her thoughts might not be her own – or, rather, that they are beyond her control. 
Therefore, one similarity between reading and voice-hearing which The Comforters suggests 
is that in both types of experience one “hears” the words of another which are not self-
authored, yet which are nonetheless self-generated (regardless of the fact that they might not 
necessarily feel self-generated). Furthermore, the presence of this “Other” who features in 
both types of experience and who is simultaneously a part of and yet distinct from the self, 
might well produce the feeling of the self being “split” – although how this feeling will be 
interpreted and emotionally experienced will depend heavily on context (since the activity of 
reading establishes a context in which such a split is to be expected).2 Indeed, during reading, 
as Poulet observes, this splitting of self results from the feeling that “this thought which is 
alien to me and yet in me, must also have in me a subject which is alien to me. It all happens, 
then, as though reading were the act by which a thought managed to bestow itself within me 
with a subject not myself” (60). Yet since this “schizoid distinction” ultimately delivers the 
reader from “egocentricity” (63, 67), Poulet implies that it is an effect to be desired. The all-
important difference between reading and voice-hearing, however, is that the reader at some 
point makes the conscious decision to “deliver” themselves, “bound hand and foot, to the 
omnipotence of fiction” (58), and can ultimately designate the novel itself as the source of 
this alien subject. As I go on to discuss in the next section, Spark’s novel explores how and 
why this splitting of self which results from the experience of hearing voices can produce 
distress outside the context of reading.  
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Since the reader is still peripherally or at least marginally aware of the text’s 
existence, the experiences of reading and voice-hearing remain phenomenologically distinct. 
Yet it is their underlying similarity which posed such a challenge to Spark’s attempt to 
convey the experientiality of AVHs, since the activity of reading is already imitative of 
voice-hearing in a way which is so familiar to us that it passes unnoticed. Her use of 
metalepsis thus serves to defamiliarize the reader from the usual experience of reading – in a 
manner that can be interpreted, in turn, as an attempt to convey the phenomenology of AVHs. 
However, the way in which Spark uses metafictional play in order to represent (or enact) 
hallucinatory experience also has further implications regarding how such experiences affect 
the experiencing subject. For while the metaleptic intrusions of the narrative voice perhaps 
make Caroline seem a more overtly fictional character than fictional characters tend to be, the 
novel still nonetheless cues the reader to construct Caroline as an individual feeling and 
experiencing certain mental states. In the following section I thus examine how Spark uses a 
specific form of metafictional play in order to model Caroline’s experience of AVHs, and 
explore how Spark’s techniques reflect her sophisticated understanding of the relationship 
between agency and the individual’s sense of self.  
 
 
 
Voices, Agency, and the Sense of Self 
 
“‘But this is intolerable.’ ‘Doesn’t it depend on how you take it?’’ (Spark, TC 63). This 
exchange, between Caroline and her spiritual mentor Father Jerome, occurs at a major turning 
point in the novel, since it is here that Caroline “realizes” that she is hearing the narrative of 
“‘a writer on another plane of existence’” (64). Caroline's interpretation is, of course, one 
way of “taking it”, and the content of the voice’s utterances changes accordingly, announcing 
the fictitiousness of all of the characters when it next appears. Yet perhaps more significantly, 
Father Jerome’s response suggests that what is primarily important is not the experience 
itself, but rather what it signifies to the experiencer, i.e. Caroline. In turn, what is distressing 
about Caroline’s experience – what makes it intolerable to her – is not just the content of her 
hallucinations but what their occurrence suggests to her, and the way in which the fact of 
their presence troubles the foundations of her sense of self. Spark thus uses the framework of 
AVHs to explore those foundations, and in this regard the particular content of Caroline’s 
hallucinations, although not falling within the bounds of realism per se, can be viewed as part 
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of Spark’s overall attempt to articulate her views on real-world selves and their relationship 
to questions of agency. Therefore, while in one sense Spark’s portrayal of AVHs is perhaps 
not realistically representative of the actual experience of voice-hearing, in another sense it 
serves to represent the potential effects of such an experience on the individual.  
When she decides that the voices she hears are the utterances of an “‘irresponsible 
writer’” from another dimension (107), what appears to trouble Caroline above all – and what 
she protests against most strongly – is the possibility that she is being narrated, and that not 
only are her “‘thoughts and actions [being] controlled by some unknown, possibly sinister 
being’” (108), but that her own existence is open to question. The one appears to imply the 
other, for it is only after she has interpreted the voices as the transdimensional utterances of 
an author writing about her life that she hears the narrator claim that “the characters in this 
novel are all fictitious, and do not refer to any living persons whatsoever” (70). Her 
subsequent attempt to thwart the voice’s proleptic assertion that she and Laurence are to 
travel by car to Smuggler’s Retreat is thus a fairly logical attempt to prove her own existence: 
if she can act contrary to the narrator’s story, she cannot be a fictional character in his work. 
Of course, when her attempt fails she begins to cast about for other ways of proving her own 
existence, claiming, for instance, that “‘this physical pain convinces me that I’m not a wholly 
fictional character. I have independent life’” (168). Yet even here she is conceding that she 
feels herself not to be a wholly “real” person either, and evidently her inability to exercise 
free will has led her to doubt her ontological purchase as an actual being in the world. While 
she might be convinced that she has the capacity to experience sensations, this capacity is not 
in itself enough to convince her that she is wholly “real”, since it is evident that the ability to 
perform conscious acts – an ability which she feels divested of because of the controlling 
power of the narrator – constitutes an intrinsic part of her sense of self, or, to be more precise, 
her sense of being a self. The particular dynamics of Caroline’s delusion and the 
metafictional quandaries it raises thus allow Spark to explore exactly why the senses of self 
and agency are connected in this fashion. 
Aside from creating situations which directly challenge Caroline’s capacity for 
agency, the conceit of the author narrating a character into existence is also suggestive of why 
the capacity for agency is essential to the internal construction of the sense of self. As 
Pacherie observes: 
What we do tells us, and others, a lot about who we are. On the one hand, who we are determines what 
we do. On the other hand, acting is also a process of self-discovery and self-shaping. Pivotal to this 
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mutual shaping of self and agency is the sense of agency, or agentive self-awareness, that is, the sense 
that one is the agent of an action. (“Self-Agency” 442) 
On becoming aware of the narrative voice, however, Caroline can no longer be sure whether 
her actions have their point of origin in her self, or whether they are dictated to her in order 
that they might fit with the narrator’s “‘slick plot’” (107). While this does not mean that she 
feels as if her actions are not her own (as is the case in certain delusions such as alien hand 
syndrome), it does mean that she cannot partake in the bi-directional process of self-
discovery and self-shaping because she cannot know whether her “‘mind is working under 
the pressure of someone else’s necessity’” (107), which, as a result of her delusion, is how 
she begins to view the minds of others. While usually “[a]gents are seen as first causes or 
uncaused causes, origins of actions to which authorship can be ascribed” (Wegner and 
Sparrow, 1202), Caroline’s belief in the power of the transdimensional author means that she 
cannot trust that she is really the first, uncaused cause of her own actions. For this reason, her 
actions can longer serve as reliable indications of the network of beliefs, desires and goals 
which is essential to her sense of who she is. 
 Yet Spark’s representation of Caroline’s initial experience of hearing the voice is also 
indicative of the connection between self and agency, in that it shows how hallucinations 
disrupt and problematize that connection. Above all, Caroline fears that the voices are 
“hallucinations sent forth from her own mind” (42), and thus tellingly locates the distinction 
between sanity and madness in the sphere of action by deciding that it is a question of 
whether she is “being haunted” or “haunting herself” (45). As Wegner observes, the self is 
“the picture of a virtual agent, a mind that is apparently guiding the action”, and this picture 
is a construction based on an accumulation of “causal inferences about how our minds seem 
to be involved in producing our behaviours” (30). Caroline, however, is faced with the 
possibility that ‘her own mind’ is producing behaviors over which she has no control, and this 
opens up the further possibility that what she considers as her self is actually “split”. Indeed, 
even in thinking about her own mind as a result of her experiences she necessarily 
conceptualizes her mind as being somehow distinct from herself, as one of her self’s 
properties or constituent parts rather than actually being the self itself. Her delusion, by 
attributing the voice’s utterances to an external agent, can thus be seen as an attempt to resist 
the splitting or bifurcation of self which would be suggested by the presence of another 
internal agent.  
In locating her sanity along the axis of agency, Caroline also displays a hyper-
awareness of her own impact on the world around her. Because she fears that without her 
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conscious control her mind has projected sounds into her environment, she also begins to fear 
any unintentional changes to her environment which her body produces. After accidentally 
knocking over a glass dish, she subsequently feels a need “[t]o protect herself from the noises 
of her movements” (37), since such unintentional noises further serve to exacerbate her sense 
of being unable to control her effects on her environment. As she escapes the flat she 
therefore attempts to reassert this sense of control by performing intentional acts which 
produce noise:  
Coat – hat – handbag – suitcase; Caroline grabbed them and hustled out of the door, slamming it to. 
She rattled downstairs and out of the front door, which she slammed behind her. At the top of 
Queen’s Gate, turning in from Old Brompton Road, she got a taxi and secured herself inside it with a 
slam of the door. (38, my italics) 
By slamming every door between herself and her flat, Caroline repeats her actions in a way 
that forcefully demonstrates her ability to create deliberate aural change in her environment. 
As a result, she feels she has “secured herself”, just as she felt a need to “protect herself” 
from creating unintentional changes to her environment. The use of such verbs in this context 
implies not only that Caroline feels herself to be under threat, but also that she feels able to 
alleviate this threat through action, by re-establishing her sense of being in control of how she 
affects the world around her. Furthermore, by deliberately affecting her environment in this 
way she also attempts to re-establish what Russell terms the “‘theoretical’ notion” of self-
world dualism, which is “an awareness of one’s place in the physical universe as at once an 
object within it and an experiencer of it” (72). While Russell argues that the experience of 
agency is necessary for the development of the conception of self-world dualism, it would 
also appear that the notion of self-world dualism is necessary for the “higher-order” 
conception of ourselves as agents. If, as Malafouris suggests, agency is in reality the 
“emergent product of material engagement” which “constantly violates and transgresses the 
physical boundaries of the elements that constitute it” (34, 35), both future action-planning 
and retrospective action-recognition (outside of the immediate embodied action) require us to 
have a conception of ourselves as being distinct from our environment. However, Caroline’s 
hallucinatory experiences undermine her conceptual notion of self-world dualism because 
they demonstrate that the mind has the capacity to produce sensations which feel as if they 
have come from the world “outside”, thus destabilizing the boundary between self and world. 
In this regard, Caroline’s repetitive actions can be seen as part of an attempt to preserve her 
notion of self-world dualism by reinforcing her sense of being an agent deliberately altering 
her environment. Her delusion of the transdimensional author can also be understood as 
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performing a similar function, for in attributing the voices she hears to an external agent she 
is able to retain her sense of self-world dualism and her sense of the controlling self. 
Ironically, of course, this delusion eventually undermines her sense of ontological being 
altogether, since she feels divested of her capacity for genuine agency. 
 On several levels, therefore, The Comforters suggests that hallucinatory experiences 
cast the sense of self into doubt because their presence troubles the conceptual foundations 
upon which the sense of self resides. In particular, the novel shows how Caroline’s sense of 
agency is compromised by her AVHs, since their presence implies that her mind is capable of 
acting outside of her conscious control. This implication arises from the fact that the presence 
of the voice not only suggests the presence of another internal agent – thus producing the 
sense of the self being split – but also demonstrates to the experiencing subject that the mind 
takes an active part in constructing the “external” world, thus radically destabilizing the 
“theoretical” notion of self-world dualism which agency reciprocally reinforces and relies 
upon. While Caroline attempts to avoid countenancing these possibilities by attributing the 
voice to an external agent (the transdimensional author), this interpretation ultimately leads 
her to doubt her capacity for agency altogether, and subsequently her sense of being an 
ontologically real entity. Through Caroline’s “delusion” of being a fictional character Spark 
is thus able to explore exactly why self and agency are connected in this fashion, showing 
how the performance of agentive, self-directed action informs the sense of possessing and 
inhabiting a persistent identity with a set of beliefs, desires and goals. Therefore, while the 
specifics of Caroline’s hallucinatory experiences are not typical of AVHs in general, Spark’s 
portrayal of those experiences supports the emerging hypothesis that part of what is 
distressing about hallucinatory experiences is that their presence destabilizes the foundational 
assumptions upon which the sense of agency – and selfhood – are based.  
 
 
 
The experimental metafictional devices which feature in The Comforters can thus be viewed 
as carrying out two distinct yet integrated functions. On the one hand such devices convey the 
experientiality of AVHs by evoking certain types of readerly response. The metaleptic 
intrusion of the narrative voice into the text world serves to imitate the disturbing, reality-
altering quality of hallucinatory experiences, while the different intentional aspect which is 
common to such experiences is mimicked by the phenomenological difference attendant on 
the repetition of ‘code’ passages as identical ‘content’ passages. Furthermore, the novel’s 
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metafictional play works to defamiliarize the reader from those already familiar and thus 
unnoticed aspects of the phenomenology of reading which are akin to the phenomenology 
AVHs, such as the sense of the split self and the loss of agency.  
On the other hand, the dynamics of the relationship which Spark creates between 
Caroline and the narrative voice are also representative of how hallucinatory experience 
affects the experiencing subject. By toying with conventions regarding the autonomy and 
ontology of fictional characters, Spark shows how AVHs have the potential to destabilize 
one’s sense of self by damaging some of the foundations upon which the self is based. In 
particular, their occurrence implies that the mind is capable of acting independently of the 
controlling self, thus threatening the agentive nexus which is shown throughout the novel to 
be crucial to the construction and maintenance of the sense of self.  
In this way Spark attempts to allow the reader to inhabit Caroline’s hallucinatory 
experiences through their interaction with the structure or “format” of the narrative, as well as 
through the kind of empathetic identification which readers normally feel for characters. 
However, rather than being the kind of emotional engagement with experiences of suffering 
which Spark disparages in “The Desegregation of Art”, this is a form of empathy which is 
designed to be distinctly troubling. For even as the novel plays with the reader, self-
consciously demonstrating that the reader’s mind is also “‘under the suggestive power of 
some irresponsible writer’” (107), it also seeks to emphasize that the foundations that 
underlie the senses of self and agency are not as reassuringly stable as we might otherwise 
think them to be.  
 
 
 
                                                     
1 For a detailed account of the phenomenology of AVHs, see: Angela Woods et al. “Experiences of Hearing 
Voices: Analysis of a Novel Phenomenological Survey.” The Lancet Psychiatry 2.4 (2015): 323-331. Web. 3 
Nov. 2015. 
2 The remark by Stonebridge quoted above suggests that reading establishes a context in which we expect to 
hear the voices of others, and that it is our consciousness of this context which prevents the experience from 
being disturbing.  
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